USPTO issues Final Rule Setting and adjusting Trademark fees
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Professor Carlisle’ Friday Blog Post – Google Called to the Carpet in Canada
Dear assorted sages and divas,
“We have not, to date, accepted that freedom of expression requires the facilitation of the unlawful sale of goods.” 1
With those incisive words, the Supreme Court of Canada finally called Google out for its long time practice of turning a blind eye to infringement of intellectual property, and ordered that Google block a pirate site, not just in Canada, but around the world.
Read about it here:
http://copyright.nova.edu/canada-google/
Stephen Carlisle
Nova Southeastern University
Copyright Officer
Alvin Sherman Library, Research and
Information Technology Center
Suite 2012
Phone: 954-262-4608
Email: [email protected]
SCOTUS Rules Lanham Act’s Disparagement Clause Unconstitutional
The opinion can be found here.
Life Technologies (SCOTUS) – No Patent Infringement under §271(f)(1) For Supplying a Single Component for Manufacture Abroad
On Thursday the SCOTUS issued its opinion in Life Technologies Corp. v Promega Corp. Below is an excerpt from the Court’s Syllabus, and the full opinion is attached here 14-1538_p8k0
Congress enacted §271(f) …to fill a gap in the enforceability of patent rights by reaching components that are manufactured in the United States but assembled overseas. Consistent with Congress’s intent, a supplier may be liable under §271(f)(1) for supplying from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of the invention or under §271(f)(2) for supplying a single component if it is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity.
But, as here, when a product is made abroad and all components but a single commodity article are supplied from abroad, the activity is outside the statute’s scope.
Ninth Circuit Upholds Customs’ Right to Impose Civil Penalty on Importer of Counterfeit Hilfiger Watches Even Though Hilfiger did not make Watches at Time of Seizure
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed a district court ruling that U.S. Customs could not impose a civil penalty on an importer of counterfeit Tommy Hilfiger watches because Hilfiger itself did not make watches at the time of the seizure. U.S. v Able Time, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2008 WL 4350027 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2008). Able Time, Inc. imported a shipment of watches into the United States. The watches bore the mark “TOMMY,” which is a registered trademark owned by Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. Tommy Hilfiger did not make or sell watches at the time of the seizure. However, it owned a U.S. trademark registration for the mark “TOMMY” in International Class 3 for cosmetics, cologne and similar products. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection seized the watches pursuant to the Tariff Act, which authorizes seizure of any “merchandise bearing a counterfeit mark.” 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e). Customs’ forfeiture action against the watches was dismissed for defective service of process and could not be re-filed because the statute of limitations had run. However, Customs also imposed a civil penalty upon Able Time pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1526(f), which authorizes the imposition of a fine upon any person who imports merchandise that is seized under § 1526(e). The district court concluded on summary judgment that, because Tommy Hilfiger did not make watches at the time of the seizure, the watches imported by Able Time were not counterfeit, and the civil penalty imposed by Customs was unlawful. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Customs may impose a civil penalty pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1526(f) upon an importer of merchandise bearing a counterfeit mark, even though the owner of the registered mark does not manufacture or sell the same type of merchandise. Under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, “to run afoul of the civil penalty provision of the Tariff Act,… the offending merchandise must bear a mark identical to or substantially indistinguishable from a registered trademark owned by a United States citizen or corporation, where the offending merchandise copies or simulates the registered trademark, meaning that it is likely to cause the public to associate the offending merchandise with the registered trademark under the” traditional likelihood of confusion test applied in the Ninth Circuit (the Sleekcraft test). It remanded the case to the district court to determine whether (1) the mark on the watches is identical to or substantially indistinguishable from the registered mark pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1127, and (2) whether the offending mark copies or simulates the registered mark pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1124, which amounts to the traditional likelihood of confusion test for infringement.
